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Abstract: To what extent are questions of sovereign debt a 
matter for political rather than scientific or moral adjudication? 
We answer that question by defending three claims. We argue 
that (i) moral and scientific takes on sovereign debt tend to be 
ideological in a pejorative sense of the term, and that therefore 
(ii) sovereign debt should be politicised all the way down. We 
then show that this sort of politicisation need not boil down to 
the crude Realpolitik of debtor-creditor power relations—a 
conclusion that would leave no room for normative theory, 
among other problems. Rather, we argue that (iii) a realist 
approach to politics centred on what Bernard Williams calls 
‘The Basic Legitimation Demand’ allows us to assess the 
normative merits of public debt policy options vis-a-vis 
democratic legitimacy in a deliberative fashion, without relying 
on unviably controversial scientific claims or moral 
commitments. 
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Introduction 
In this paper we put forward an argument for politicising public 
debt in ways compatible with the requirements of democratic 
politics. Sovereign (or public) debt1 is currently at the forefront 
of politics in Western states.2 Policy initiatives are often met 
 
1 Sovereign debt is broadly the sum of accrued government spending not 
offset by taxation. Implicit debt would include interest payments on 
outstanding government bonds. We are considering public debt owed to 
other states and to private market actors. We are not considering debt 
that is owed to the other branches of the state. 
2 By using ‘sovereign debt’ and ‘public debt’ interchangeably we restrict 
the domain of our argument to polities characterised by a democratic 
ideal of popular sovereignty. 
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with the question “How are you going to pay for it?” before the 
content of the initiative is even considered. What is politically 
possible is limited by what is deemed financially stable. To 
determine what is financially stable is widely viewed as a 
technical question best answered by economics. Failures of 
financial stability tend to be framed in a moralising tone along 
the lines of: “We will have to bail them out for their profligacy 
and their laziness!”, or by reference to seemingly 
incontrovertible scientific truths such as simple accounting 
equivalences: “Look at the national debt! We can’t spend more 
than we have coming in!” In this paper we argue that both of 
those approaches are ideological in a pejorative sense of the 
term, and so won’t do, especially in a context in which 
democracy purportedly matters. 
Moralising and technocratic narratives about profligate 
states and the economic limits to deficits and public debt have 
been a mainstay of European public discourse since the Great 
Financial Crisis (GFC) “turned” into a sovereign debt crisis 
(Frieden and Walter 2017; Tooze 2018). In moralising 
narratives, states appear either as people who do not keep 
promises and are hence morally debased or as households 
which live beyond their means. In technocratic narratives, 
states are urged to heed advice about sustainable levels of 
budget deficits and debt-to-GDP ratio. In the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), the technocratic narratives about 
deficits and debt are enshrined in European treaties, now 
mostly tied together in The Fiscal Compact (Roos 2019: 301). 
These narratives tend to claim to be above the political fray: 
they aim to displace politics with technical administration or 
with the application of moral principles. However, as we will 
see, these narratives remain political in the sense of seeking to 
justify the pursuit of particular interests under the guise of 
general interest or in the sense of claiming that “there is no 
alternative” despite choices being open—two classic forms of 
ideological distortion (Geuss 1981). The leading narratives seek 
to prevent us from recognising public debt as political. 
Our alternative proposal is that public debt must be 
politicised all the way down. One may take that to mean that 
debt is just a matter of Realpolitik: crudely speaking, creditors 
and debtors backed up by force weighing the opportunity cost 
of default, enforcement, and so on. That picture would leave 
little room for a normative theory of sovereign debt. We reject 
the false choice between depoliticisation (moralism and 
technocracy) and the Realpolitik of public debt. Instead, we 
argue that a realistic understanding of politics can keep that 
theoretical space open, without lapsing into either technocracy, 
or moralism, or both. The rough idea is this. One may think that, 
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once the moralising or technocratic ideology of public debt 
discourse has been exposed, all that is left is the bare fact of 
power relations between debtors and creditors. However, we 
aim to show that a critique of the ideology of public debt affords 
an opportunity for a genuinely democratic politicisation of debt 
relations, thanks to re-elaboration of Bernard Williams’ realist 
theory of legitimacy. We argue that in a context in which 
democracy purportedly matters the politics of public debt 
require a form of ideology-free, non-moralised justifiability of 
the relevant power relations, and make some practical 
suggestions about how this justifiability may be achieved. 
Attention to sovereign debt has been sparse in political 
theory3 until a recent spike in interest in the topic which has 
been focused on the ethics of sovereign default (Wiedenbrüg 
2017; 2018; Wollner 2018) and central bank authority during 
debt crises (Klooster 2018; 2019).4 These writings, which start 
from the odious debt literature, take on the important task of 
challenging the idea that sovereign debts have to be paid in full 
no matter what (“pacta sunt servanda” etc.). However, they 
tend to remain anchored to the technical-economic and 
moralizing approaches (e.g. by framing the question as one of 
when the “repayment norm” holds). Political economists (Roos 
2019) and historians (Dyson 2014) have debated sovereign debt 
in much more detail, though those disciplines mostly refrain 
from engaging with normative issues. We will take a realist 
approach in order to place those empirical findings in the 
service of a normative political theory that does not fall back 
onto moral commitments (mis-)construed as pre-political.  
A striking recent example of the direct and dramatic ways in 
which the discourse about, and governance of, sovereign debt 
displace politics is the agreement of the third rescue package 
between Greece and the ECB, IMF and European Union (the 
“Troika”). The left-wing Syriza government agreed to the 
austerity-inducing rescue package despite the fact that a very 
recent referendum, which they had initiated, rejected the 
 
3 As debt used to be central to the history of political theory, its absence 
in the second half of twentieth century is surprising. We view this as a 
symptom of the attention to power in Anglophone analytical political 
theory during this period (Thanks to Eric Schliesser for highlighting this 
observation). More attention has been paid to the normative 
consequences of sovereign indebtedness in terms of the self-
determination of states in the Global South, e.g. during the 1980s debt 
crises, see e.g. work by Susan George (1992) and recent development 
economics. 
4 Alexander Douglas’s timely The Philosophy of Debt (2016) provides a 
more general philosophical treatment of the institution of debt which 
also reaches into macroeconomics, public finance, and questions of 
sovereign debt. 
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terms of the agreement. In the next section, we analyse the 
Greek crisis to substantiate our contention that both 
technocratic and moralistic takes on public debt aren’t what 
they seem: they lead to an inappropriate public image which 
serves to support the interests of social groups favoured by the 
status quo, and so  are ideological in a pejorative sense of the 
term.5 In the subsequent section we articulate what we take 
that diagnosis to entail, namely that public debt should be 
politicised all the way down. That will allow us to return to our 
initial case study and show how, in a way, what went wrong 
with the Greek debt crisis is that an ideological smokescreen 
was used to bypass a complicated issue in democratic theory – 
i.e. the social and political significance of public debt, including 
the allocation of burdens connected to it – with a power game 
among financial and governmental elites. More precisely, the 
ideological conception of public debt led to the wrong kind of 
politics for a democratic context—wrong insofar as the politics 
of public debt concentrated rather than diffused elite power. 
We then put forward a two-pronged approach to reform the 
politics of public debt in a democratic direction.  
 
Moralism and technocracy 
Let us begin with a thumbnail sketch of the Greek debt 
crisis. The Great Financial Crisis spread from the United States 
to Europe in 2009. Greece quickly became one of the most 
affected countries in what came to be known as the European 
Debt Crisis, with several banks close to bankruptcy. By 2010, 
Greek public finances had deteriorated to a degree such that a 
default on the country’s public debt was imminent.6 An initial 
rescue package was agreed with the European Commission, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) in 2010, with follow up agreements in 2012 and 
2015. The rescue packages were conditional on Greece 
adopting an agenda of austerity, labour law liberalisation, and 
large-scale privatisation of public assets (as stipulated in 
Economic Adjustment Programmes and the Memorandums of 
Understanding between Greece and the Troika (European 
Commission 2019). The austerity component saw social 
 
5 For an insightful, undogmatic and accessible discussion of the notion 
of ideology, see Finlayson 2016, chapter 3. 
6 From the beginning of the crisis public debt rose from 95% to 115% of 
GDP, and the budget deficit came close to 15% of GDP. In this context 
sales of Greek bonds spiked, as did the interest rates on them (Verde 
2011: 144ff). At the time, it also emerged that Greece had previously 
manipulated their public finance statistics to hide the extent of its budget 
deficits. 
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services, public pensions, and overall economic activity 
drastically reduced for several years (Kivotidis 2018).7 The 
measures of the first and second bailout packages 
systematically shifted the structure of Greece’s creditors 
between 2010 and 2015, allowing foreign banks to reduce their 
exposure to a Greek sovereign default (Roos 2019, chapters 17-
19). This shift was brought about by spending most of the 
bailouts on foreign debt service8 and through the programmes 
of the ECB for buying Greek government bonds (‘SMP’). By 
2015, the ratio of private to public foreign holders of Greek 
public debt had been inverted from 80% private and 20% public 
to 20% private and 80% public, whilst the relative magnitude of 
domestically held public debt rose as well (see Roos 2019, 263-
268). Thereby the costs in the event of a Greek sovereign 
default were shifted from (stockholders of) Northern European 
banks toward the European populations, in particular to the 
Greek population – at this point Greek banks were most 
exposed to Greek sovereign bond risk – already suffering under 
the most drastic austerity programme in the history of the EU.9  
The debt crisis challenged the structure of Greek democracy 
and led to drastic change in Greek politics. In the period until 
2015, the debt crisis arguably had already shaken the 
foundations of the post-dictatorship order by strengthening the 
executive to the point that the legislative powers of the Greek 
parliament were in doubt (e.g. through rule by decree and the 
installation of an unelected expert government) and by 
conceding control over public finance at least partly to the 
Troika of creditors (Roos 2019, conclusion; Kivotidis 2018). At 
the same time, political protests reached record levels (Karyotis 
and Rüdig 2018; Kouvelakis 2011), with at times multiple events 
per day across the country. The electoral victory of anti-
 
7 Overall, the population was hit hard by the crisis. Disposable income 
fell by 40% on average in the period between 2007 and 2014. 
Unemployment throughout the past decade stayed close to or above 
20%, whilst youth unemployment hovered closer to 75%. The negative 
impact of the crisis on public health has been significant (Simou and 
Koutsogeorgou 2014). 
8 According to the European School of Management and Technology in 
Berlin “only 5 percent of the total international bailout funds actually 
went to Greek government expenditure; the remaining 95 percent went 
straight back to the country’s bondholders” (Roos 2019: 267) 
9 Roos (2019: 238) suggests that “[a]fter an initial period of dithering and 
denial, the French and German governments […] decided that they 
should prevent default at all costs: they would rather bail out their own 
banks indirectly, by providing an enormous emergency loan to the Greek 
government and subsequently forcing the country to repay its debts in 
full, than allow Greece to suspend payments and be forced to bail out 
their own banks directly.” 
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austerity left alliance Syriza in January 2015, which ended the 
longstanding duopoly of the conservative (ND) and social-
democratic (PASOK) parties, was poised to lead to a rejection of 
the bailout agreements between the Troika and Greece. In the 
late spring of 2015, the conflict came to a head. The Syriza 
government decided to hold a referendum on the question of 
whether to accept the terms proposed by the Troika for the 
third bailout. Syriza had promised in their election manifesto 
not to accept the terms of the Troika. The terms were rejected 
in the referendum with 61,3% voting against the terms (at a 
turnout of ca. 62,5%). However, shortly afterwards, the Tsipras 
government - under strong pressure from the Troika to either 
accept the terms or leave the Eurozone – agreed to arguably 
worse conditions for the third bailout package. Tsipras then 
resigned and called for elections, in which a Syriza government 
was returned to power. However, those parliamentarians of 
Syriza who rejected the deal had either split from the party or 
stood down, including the former finance minister Yannis 
Varoufakis. After their demise, the Tsipras government broadly 
worked with the terms set by the Troika despite relatively minor 
quibbles. The recent successes of primary budget surpluses 
(before debt service is taken into account) should not paper 
over the fact that wage levels have not yet reached pre-2009 
levels in Greece (Hellenic Statistical Authority 2019; Romei 
2018).  
 
For the purposes of our critical exercise, it will be important 
to identify the notion of public debt that structured public 
debate during the Greek crisis. Our analysis of public discourse 
on this issue reveals a two-pronged notion. Public debt would 
be, ostensibly, an obligation incurred by a state that as such 
simply must be repaid (i) because it is a promise, and (ii) 
because failing to do so would lead to economic catastrophe for 
all involved, and especially the debtor state. Let us call (i) the 
moralising frame, and (ii) the technocratic frame for public 
debt. The discourses of the mainstream politicians likened the 
Greek public debt to private debt and focused either on 
grounding the obligation of Greece to pay on moral arguments 
or sought to portray decisions on Greek public debt, e.g. 
whether full or reduced repayment is required, as a form of 
technical administration to be determined by economic theory 
rather than politics. These discourses sought to provide 
normative orientations for how to deal with public debt that 
would float above the fray of politics.10 They were supposed to 
 
10 Harjuniemi 2019 shows that e.g. the influential magazine “The 
Economist” has for the past 60 years sought to contrast its reason-based 
approach to economics with politics. 
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show that either moral or technical norms rather than political 
power shape how decisions about Greek public debt are made.  
One initial sense in which the two-pronged notion of public 
debt is suspect is that it seems just too convenient how those 
two disparate—one deontological, one consequentialist—
justifications for the repayment requirement align. At any rate, 
our actual argument is that neither claim is epistemically 
tenable at the level of certainty at which it was uttered (which 
itself does not require us to offer alternative claims, as we shall 
see), nor was either claim in line with the actual practices of 
those putting it forward. If that is the case, there are at least 
two senses in which public debt is not what it seems, and so 
public debt discourse is ideological, in a pejorative sense of the 
term.  
To start off, let us observe how moralising and technocratic 
frames have different but complementary functions in the 
overall power struggles over public debt. Moralisation provides 
support for justifying payment obligations. Technocratic frames 
support a depoliticised approach to how obligations should be 
discharged. Moralising and technocratic frames are in a very 
close relationship, because moralist frames circumvent public 
discussion of payment obligations, the acceptance of which 
prepares the ground for using technocratic frames for the 
administration of payments that also circumvents public 
debate. More concretely, moralism masks the reality “that the 
norm of repayment is itself a pre-established political fact” 
(Roos 2019, 43), and is most effective at this occlusion against 
the background of the depoliticised repayment norm. 
Technocratic frames are instrumental to keeping sovereign 
debt apolitical, as in “standard economic theory” repayment is 
“considered nonpolitical by definition”, while “nonpayment is 
stigmatised as an irrational and explicitly political choice” (Roos 
2019, 43), 11despite the fact that in mainstream economics 
accounts of debt the probability of non-repayment is 
discounted in the interest rate as a matter of course.12  
The moralising framing of the Greek sovereign debt crisis 
tied the above-mentioned trope of private irresponsibility to 
ethno-cultural stereotypes of “Northern Saints” and “Southern 
 
11 The “there is no alternative” narrative adopted by powerful media to 
public debt repayment (see e.g. reporting on Argentina and Greece, 
Mercille 2013; Antoniades 2013) further bolsters the technocratic 
framing. 
12 What is more, standard approaches to portfolio management assume 
non-performing loans and, given the desirability of a certain amount of 
uncorrelated assets, even advises acquiring loans with a higher chance 
of. non-repayment (Meyer 2018). We thank Eric Schliesser for pointing 
this out to us. 
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Sinners” (Mathijs and McNamara 2015; see also Mylonas 2018; 
Kutter 2014; Kitromilides 2013; Vaara 2014). Moralising 
narratives were so powerful that “[e]ven the potentially 
catastrophic stresses of the EU-wide contagion unleashed by 
Greece’s fiscal insolvency and subsequent financial crisis could 
not dislodge the view that national problems of fiscal profligacy 
and weak competitiveness were the source of the problem” 
(Mathijs and McNamara 2015, 243). The moralising framing 
portrayed repayment obligations as categorical, playing on an 
analogy between the personal norm of keeping promises and 
the “pacta sunt servanda” idea which views agreements 
between states as similar to promises between individuals. 
The technocratic framing had two main themes: first, that 
the conditions under which Greece should be provided with 
liquidity would be set unilaterally by the experts and creditors. 
The following comments by German finance minister Wolfgang 
Schäuble illustrate this theme: “The Troika has been asked by 
the European member states to discuss this [the European 
crisis], and every time the members meet, its own existence, 
and especially the IMF's involvement is discussed. The Troika 
has decided the governments of the countries in need of loan 
programmes should not participate in the negotiation because 
we trust in the institutions with the most expertise, with the 
most experience, and that know most of the facts. Those are, 
first, the European Commission [...] second, the very 
independent European Central Bank, and third, the most 
experienced institution, namely the IMF. These three know 
what is economically right. [...] The conditions the Troika sets 
cannot be approved by the European Parliament because the 
Troika has the sort of independent economic knowledge, the 
European Parliament lacks, to take the necessary decisions" 
(Schäuble 2012).”13 The second theme was that any rescue 
package would follow the logic of technical administration 
rather than politics. Schäuble’s claim that the Greeks “can vote 
however they want, but whatever election result we have will 
change nothing about the actual situation in the country” 
summarises this theme succinctly.14 
 
 
13 Consider also the following statement from Schäuble: "Greece has to 
suffer structural reforms to become competitive, otherwise Greece will 
never be able to stand up to the expectations political leaders raise in 
campaigning. [...] If Greece sticks to the agreement [the third 
Memorandum of Understanding], and if the program gets implemented 
decisively and fully, then the Greek economy can grow again over the 
next years. [...] The opportunity is given and whether it will be taken is a 
decision solely up to the Greek people" (Schäuble 2015).  
14 See Ojala and Harjuniemi (2016) for a discussion of technocratic media 
narratives since the start of the GFC. 
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We are now in a position to see exactly why the framing of 
Greek public debt by the creditors—both for their domestic 
audiences and in their attempts to make their cases to the 
Greek debtors—was not what it seems. The first problem has 
to do with the lack of alignment between creditors’ discourse 
and their behaviour. This is true of both the moralising and the 
technocratic frame, though it is perhaps most evident in the 
former case, and most relevant too, insofar as a deceptive 
behaviour by those claiming the moral high ground is 
particularly callous. Decisions about public debt were framed as 
a matter of morality, or more precisely moral hazard, the idea 
being that one must not socialise debt if people live beyond 
their means. Yet actual decisions were made on the basis of 
political expedience and relative power of creditors and 
debtors, contrary to the morality tale, and also in contradiction 
to the technocratic frame’s predictions. Whilst the fear of the 
socialisation of credit risk was mobilised in the discourse about 
“Northern saints” and “Southern sinners”, the Troika’s first two 
bailout packages brought about the socialisation of Greek debt 
through the back door of the ECB (see above). It was politically 
expedient for states home to the banks most exposed to a 
Greek default to rescue the private Northern European banks 
highly exposed to a default of the Greek state and Greek 
businesses.15 In other words, the moralised discourse was 
inconsistent on its own terms from the start16 (see Herzfeld 
2016a; 2016b; Kitromilides 2013). However, the moralisation 
and technocratic narratives stuck anyway. Even when Germany 
turned a profit on the Greek bailout and the ECB profited from 
trading Greek bonds to Greece both frames remained in place 
(Roos 2019, 270, 285).17  
In addition to being inconsistent with the actual practices of 
their supporters, both frames are also epistemically untenable, 
at least relative to the degree of conviction with which they 
were advocated. In the case of the moralising frame, this is 
exemplified most clearly by the remarks by German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel: “One should simply have asked a Swabian 
housewife […] She would have told us her worldly wisdom: in 
the long run, you can’t live beyond your means” (Merkel quoted 
 
15 In other words, to a considerable extent the Greek state’s agreement 
to the bailout “rescued” investors in Northern Banks, not vice versa. 
16 Note also that the “socialization” of risk coincided with the 
consolidation of power of the ECB over Greece (Roos, 247-248), 
becoming its “biggest bondholder in the short term in 2011. 
17 Alexander Douglas has shown that the moralist argument for balanced 
budgets is self-defeating. In as far as the state is ultimately responsible 
for the viability and the moral standing of the institution of debt, under 
capitalism its legitimacy is tied to the provision of sufficient debt 
resources (Douglas 2016, 152-3). 
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in Bennhold 2010). While, as we will see shortly, there is little 
agreement among economists about the exact workings of 
public debt within an economy, there is no doubt about the fact 
that a household budget is not a good analogy to a state’s 
balance sheet (Farmer and Zabczyk 2018). 
The epistemically untenable character of the technocratic 
narrative is highlighted by the fact that the supposed consensus 
among economists about the response to the European public 
debt crises does not exist. In (international) political economy 
and heterodox economics, the supposed consensus view on 
debt repayment and austerity is actually highly contested (Blyth 
2012). And even within mainstream macroeconomics there are 
fundamental disagreements on the likely effects of austerity on 
states’ balance sheets (compare Alesina et al. 2019; Alesina and 
Ardagna 2011; Reinhart and Rogoff 2010 to Krugman 2015; 
Wren-Lewis 2015). In fact, in the case of the Troika, factions 
within the IMF opposed extending a loan to Greece under the 
conditions proposed by the ECB and EC due to concerns about 
the sustainability of the debt.18 Even the ranks of IMF 
technocracy broke when the austerity package was found to be 
ill-judged and to engender socially unacceptable distributions 
of burdens (Roos 2019: 269-271).19  
Moralisation and technocracy are political strategies whose 
appeal stems from their claim to float above the partisanship 
that characterises politics and to possess extra-political 
foundations and uncontroversial validity. Extra-political 
foundations and claims of uncontroversial validity are supposed 
to show that these frames serve a general interest. As we have 
seen, however, moralisation and technocracy do not possess 
such uncontroversial validity. Rather than providing the morally 
most sound and most rational approach to public debt, the 
main function of these frames is to mask how political actors 
actually deal with public debt, as we will see shortly. 
 
Now, if mainstream public discourse on debt is not what it 
seems, what is it? To answer this question, it may be useful to 
begin from an important distortion engendered by both the 
moralising and the technocratic frame. Both moralisation and 
technocracy treat states as unitary actors, which is a distortion, 
given that different groups within the state are affected in very 
different ways by public debt, and are responsible to a very 
different degree and in different ways for the extent of public 
debt. Indeed, we want to show that the politics masked by the 
 
18 An ad-hoc change of the IMF rules introduced through the back door 
was necessary for the IMF to participate in the Troika. 
19 Other critical notes from within broadly technocratic views include 
Buchheit and Gulati (2010); Modi (2015). 
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two ideological frames is a form of bellicose oligarchy—little 
short of a class war in service to very particular interests, as 
demonstrated by some of the most authoritative 
reconstructions of the events in Greece 2010-2018 (Roos 2019; 
Roufos 2018).20 Simplifying somewhat, we maintain that this 
kind of politics of public debt is an instrument for shifting 
around power amongst governmental and financial elites and 
sidestepping the perspective of the vast majority of the affected 
populations of debtor and even creditor states. More 
specifically, the mechanism that structures the real politics of 
public debt can be understood as composed of two related 
types of reduction to mere power relations: (i) a reduction of 
the force of the loan agreement to the power relations between 
debtors and creditors, and (ii) an identification of debtors and 
creditors with financial and governmental elites.  
We can illustrate that point by returning to our case study 
of the Greek crisis. The oligarchic mechanism can be 
schematically reconstructed as follows. A combination of 
market pressure from a cartel of lenders (Roos 2019, 229, 232, 
283-4), political pressure from public (“official”) lenders of last 
resort (in particular the European Commission), and the pro-
creditor forces in Greek society (even within the left-wing Syriza 
government which enforced the “repayment norm” under 
duress, i.e. with an explicit threat of causing bank runs and 
other forms of social disorder). This prevented unilateral Greek 
default and structured the unfolding of the Greek public debt 
crisis. To get a sense of the concrete implications of this course 
of events, consider that, as a result of the agreement between 
the Greek state and the Troika, at one point taxes on the 
poorest rose by 333.7%, in the context of a mere 9% overall 
increase (Roos 2019, 271). Elections and even the much-touted 
‘Oxi’ referendum—in which citizens soundly rejected the terms 
of the Troika’s bailout—made no material difference to the 
outcome from the point of view of the creditors, in line with the 
pronouncements of the German finance minister we just 
reviewed. Bargaining within this elite actor constellation is what 
drives the actual politics of public debt, in spite of the moralistic 
and technocratic rhetoric that would have the public believe 
otherwise. 
 
How to politicise public debt democratically 
In the previous section we have painted quite a grim 
picture. Here we will outline an alternative politics of public 
 
20 Realpolitik is after all typically the politics of treating the state as a 
unitary actor, on behalf of which elite politicians take decisions in back 
chambers. 
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debt—one that politicises public debt all the way down in a 
democratic manner. But before we can do so, we need to 
explain why such an alternative is even possible, and why it is 
required. Indeed, someone sympathetic to an old-fashioned 
version of political realism may welcome our unveiling of the 
Realpolitik of public debt, and think that our unmasking more 
or less completes the task of political theory: we have removed 
the fig leaves of moralism and technocracy, and laid bare what 
politics is all about, namely (elite) power.21 This would mean 
that there is no normative conversation to be had, except one 
about the instrumental rationality of incentives and costs. Isn’t 
that what (re-)politicising debt means? However we want to 
show that, somewhat paradoxically, this hard-nosed 
understanding of the politics of public debt misses important 
opportunities for politicisation, at least if we understand 
politics in context, which in the case at hand means that 
democratic aspirations are a necessary element of politics . In 
other words, and despite appearances, oligarchic Realpolitik 
does not politicise public debt all the way down.  
To carve out space for our alternative proposal we need to 
first take a step back and understand the sense in which our 
account of politicisation must be context-sensitive. Here we 
rely on Bernard Williams’ (2005) by now famous realist account 
of the normativity internal to politics. In a nutshell, Williams 
maintains that normative political questions should not be 
addressed by working out the implications of pre-political moral 
commitments, but rather by working out what it means to meet 
the “Basic Legitimation Demand” in a particular context. That is 
to say, polities must provide order in ways that “make sense” 
to those over whom political power is exercised, provided also 
that subjects’ perceptions of the power are not conditioned by 
the power itself, i.e. that it is not ideologically distorted.22 
Importantly, subjects’ expectations of what is required for 
political power to make sense to them will vary with context. 
For example, Williams (2005, 8-12) maintains that in a modern 
context only a liberal order would make sense. We will not 
engage with that claim directly here. However, the general 
structure of realist context-dependence is key for our 
argument. The point we wish to highlight is simply that any 
effective politicisation of a practice—such as public debt—with 
the potential to affect a polity’s ability to meet the Basic 
 
21 The currently ascendant legal theory of finance (Pistor 2013) may be 
read as pointing in this direction. On the other hand, it also shows the 
normative discretion afforded by the entanglement of politics and 
financial markets.  
22 Williams calls this the “Critical Theory Principle”. For a discussion and 
exposition of this position see Williams 2002, 219-232. 
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Legitimation Demand will have to be formulated in a context-
sensitive way. 
So our next step will be to work out the context-sensitive 
desiderata of a realist politicisation of public debt. The relevant 
context, as we noted, is that of contemporary democratic 
politics. In which case the abstract Williamsian idea of the 
exercise of power making sense to those affected by it takes on 
a more specific connotation. Williams defines making sense as 
those holding power having “something to say” to those over 
whom power is exercised, where that something cannot be 
ideologically distorted, lest the purpose of the exercise be 
defeated.23 We have seen that, in the case of public debt, 
ideological distortion takes the form of masking actual political 
practices with the frames of technocracy and moralism. The 
question then becomes: would removing those frames be 
enough for the politics of public debt to make sense to those 
affected? We claim that it wouldn’t, and that is why there is 
both room and need for an alternative politics of public debt. 
The key to that claim is the contextualism we flagged earlier. 
Recall the point about the oligarchic character of the Realpolitik 
of public debt: the actors at play are exclusively governmental 
and financial elites. Our contention is simply that, once 
unmasked, this reality cannot be expected to make sense in a a 
context of democratic aspirations insofar as we take democracy 
to at least require a significant level of diffusion of power 
beyond the ranks of the elite. The Realpolitik of public debt is 
that it is the wrong kind of politics for the current democratic 
context, as it leads to a consolidation of elite power which 
clashes with the promise of democracy to disperse power. And 
this is why we need a way to democratise the politics of public 
debt: we need a politics of public debt that does not require the 
cover of ideological narratives.24 
To translate that point into a set of desiderata for a 
democratic politics of public debt, we may say that such a 
politics must be able to survive non-ideological public scrutiny 
by effectively dispersing power among those over whom it is 
exercised.25 Such a democratic politics would politicise public 
debt all the way down to the public at large. 
At the very least, a democratic politics of public debt must 
neither turn out to be ideologically distorting nor further the 
 
23 FN removed for blind review 
24 Note that this contextualist move is not a way to smuggle in a moral 
presupposition in order to resist the imperatives of Realpolitik. Rather, it 
is a way to ensure that a polity actually meets its basic legitimation 
demand, rather than just having the appearance of meeting it.  
25 This understanding of democracy is comparable to the ‘negative’ one 
recently developed by Samuel Bagg (2018b). 
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concentration of elite power. The more a politics of public debt 
meets these desiderata, the better its chances are of avoiding 
prevarication by private financial actors or by other states. 
Fulfilling the desiderata would principally depend on two 
related conditions, which in turn should be the basis for more 
concrete policy proposals. We can only formulate the 
conditions in rather general terms here: especially in light of our 
methodological commitments, we eschew detailed blueprints 
and maintain that concrete implementation should remain a 
matter of local political struggles.26 The two conditions are (i) 
the effectiveness of dispersing public debt-related power and 
(ii) the quality of its forms of deliberation. The hope is that if the 
two desiderata are co-realised, a revised conception of public 
debt which emphasises that public debt is a means to serve 
public purposes (and not the other way around) may develop. 
To fulfil (i), the affected public(s) at large needs to have as 
much control as possible over the process for making 
judgements and decisions about public debt (both as debtors 
and creditors). This influence needs to be appropriate to the 
debt’s importance for democratic legitimacy.27 
The effectiveness of dispersing public debt-related power 
depends on popular control over setting rules for entering into 
debt agreements and for issuing loans (underwriting) and also 
would need to extend to the review of the status of present 
loans. This would include the power to hold accountable those 
who decided to lend or borrow, at the very least in as far as 
investigating to what extent these decisions were furthering the 
public purposes of the polity. 
The effectiveness of public control in turn considerably 
depends on making public debt a mainstay of public concern 
rather than a topic reserved to moments of crisis. However, as 
the Greek crisis exemplifies, actual public discussion about 
public debt is either ideologically distorting or inappropriate for 
the democratic context and has barely advanced beyond the 
false choice between depoliticisation (moralism and 
technocracy) and the Realpolitik of public debt.  
Another important aspect of public control is the role of 
what have come to be known as official creditors—chiefly the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Here 
our democratic approach suggests a rejection of international 
organisations which seek to float above the political fray 
(typically by relying on technocratic narratives). In other words, 
 
26 For a detailed discussion of this methodological point, see [Reference 
removed for blind review] 
27 In the EMU, public debt can quickly affect the ability of the state to 
deliver order and stability and the domination or usurpation of the 
democratic sovereign by private financial actors. 
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we should try to roll back the influence of these appendages of 
the state system that have taken on a life of their own as agents 
of elite interests.  
(ii) Deliberation must put the public at large into a position 
to non-ideologically evaluate whether the regime of public debt 
(either in the role of debtor or creditor or both) furthers public 
purposes or not (and hence supports or threatens meeting the 
BLD). The point is not that deliberation is needed because it can 
neutralise power—it cannot, as ample evidence on motivated 
reasoning shows (Bagg 2018a). Deliberation is needed because 
the selection of public debt policies must be both public (in a 
non-ideologically distorted way) and open-ended. But, given 
the poor quality of current public discourse on debt, to 
formulate a proposal for deliberation on public debt we have to 
start more or less from scratch.  
To begin with, judgments and decisions made about 
matters of public debt should be presentable (and justifiable) in 
the terms that relate to the purposes of the polity as expressed 
by collective actions of citizens rather than, as we have seen 
above, in ideologically distorting moralist and technocratic 
terms that mask elite interests. Existing policies on public debt 
need to be re-examined and reframed with regard to their 
effect on, and compatibility with, these purposes.28 In as far as 
institutions like the IMF have in the past set the purposes and 
offered justification for their measures in predominantly 
technocratic terms, we expect that their legitimacy would be 
severely challenged by a democratic politics of public debt that 
meets our desiderata (Clegg 2013), in line with our criticism of 
official creditors in (i) above. 
Deliberation on public debt should further have recourse to 
(but not necessarily be directed by) the best available evidence 
which will be a combination of e.g. the known factors (global 
financial architecture etc.) and less certain matters of public 
finance (“known unknowns”).29 That is to say, technocratic 
discourse that seeks to obscure that the issue is not 
scientifically settled is unsuited to proper public deliberation—
a point familiar from debates on the role of science in public 
reason, but grounded not in ideals of equal respect for fellow 
citizens, but in the form of ideology critique we have offered. 
Our emphasis on the importance of deliberative quality for 
a democratic politics of public debt should not be mistaken for 
a proposal to turn the democratic politics of public debt into 
deliberative democracy in a narrow, technical sense, which is 
 
28 None of the above guarantees that future debates about public debt 
will not turn out to be dominated by moralism or technocracy. 
29 See Pistor 2013 for some reservations about a non-elastic legal 
framework for financial markets 
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only partly compatible with our realist commitments due to its 
modelling of politics on a quest for finding rational consensus. 
We are rather proposing a focus on the deliberative quality of 
the political processes at large (Mansbridge et al. 2012); Taking 
some inspiration from deliberative systems theorists (e.g. 
Bächtinger and Parkinson 2018), we envisage that a democratic 
politics of public debt would contain a combination of different 
forms of activism, protest, rhetorical confrontation, and public 
information campaigns. The more narrowly deliberative forms 
of exchange of reasons would only play a minor role, for realists 
still have ample reason to be cautious about the promises of 
deliberation (Bagg 2018a, Cross 2019; classically also Young 
2001).  
In our example case of the EMU and Greece, deliberation 
about public debt would need to come to terms with, amongst 
other things: the systemic importance of (limited) public debt 
for the EU project (from Maastricht to the Fiscal Compact), the 
structural tensions between different members of the EMU and 
the transnational dimension this adds to concerns with 
democratic legitimacy (Abizadeh 2008), the questioning of the 
view of the state as a unified actor, the consequences of debt 
service for different groups, and the place of public debt in 
wider dynamics of capitalist economies.30  
Increased attention paid to, and increased popular control, 
over public debt may spark interest in the political and social 
value of debt and credit, the responsibility of creditor and 
debtors for making the institution of debt and credit politically 
valuable (see Douglas 2016; Orléan 2014; see Preiss 2018 
makes a related argument about the trade-off between 
freedom and availability of credit). While Alexander Douglas 
(2016) has offered a compelling argument for the institution of 
debt which is all things considered a consequentialist case for 
productive lending and against non-productive, “extractive” 
lending, we maintain that the political value of debt, in 
particular public debt, cannot be reduced to productiveness but 
has to be anchored in the contribution debt makes to 
democratic legitimacy. Such interest may spill over into the 
examination of e.g. the public and (public-)private money 
creation, and the public basis of the value of currency etc (see 
Hockett and Omarova 2017). Indeed, understanding how such 
institutions are interwoven with the state is an important step 
toward making the monetary system—which is arguably 
increasingly interdependent with the financial system more 
 
30 If these terms sound so complicated as to lead to doubt about the 
public’s ability to understand them, that reinforces the need for broader 
public education on political economy (which, tellingly, is barely a part of 
the modern discipline of economics). 
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broadly speaking (Pistor 2013)—fit for democracy: the public 
should be able to exert some control over the system, which 
has arguably been a blind spot of much recent critical theory 
(Klein 2019). Questions remain, inter alia, about the viability 
and even the desirability of public debate on matters of 
considerable theoretical complexity—and the answers will vary 
wildly depending on context. But, at the limit, it may just be that 
complex economic institutions with the power to affect states’ 
basic legitimacy need to be made understandable to the wider 
public, or they cannot coexist with democracy.31  
To be sure, our approach is not exhaustive, nor can we 
promise it will solve the problem of the democratic legitimacy 
of public debt in two fell swoops.32 To name the most important 
missing piece, we have not touched on the issue of the power 
of private financial actors, chiefly because of our focus on 
democratic politics. Yet it is important to at least acknowledge 
the importance of those actors: for instance, 
“creditworthiness” (and its importance) is set by financial 
markets and practically uninfluenced by the electorates of 
affected states. However, as Roos (2019) has shown, markets 
“alone”33 would not have the power to enforce the current 
global public debt architecture that discourages default (either 
as repudiation of debt or as restructuring) without state 
backing, so arguably our focus can also be justified strategically. 
At any rate, our approach directly attacks two of the three 
pillars of the current regime—the hold of national elites and the 
position of official creditors—and thus at least indirectly affects 
the third, financial markets, including rating agencies (e.g. 
though national legislation and through potential changes to 
the other two pillars).34 This means that the democratic politics 
 
31 For a more general argument on the problem of theoretical complexity 
in democracy see Bertram (1997). 
32 Another challenge for our approach would be to determine how a 
democratic politics of public debt would handle disputes between 
“debtor” and “creditor” states. The politicisation of public debt in this 
sense does bear risks but also the promise of bringing to the fore that if 
we take seriously the democratic ideal that the source of power lies with 
the people, then “creditor states” ought to be constrained by 
considerations of how their choices would affect the democratic 
sovereign of a “debtor state”. A democratic politics of public debt would 
need to be particularly careful when making decisions that would on 
reasonable expectation have the potential to undermine the ability of a 
debtor state to maintain its democratic legitimacy. 
33 Markets cannot strictly speaking act alone, but always depend on the 
state for enforcement or backstop. We agree with Pistor’s (2013) “legal 
theory of finance” which emphasizes the essentially hybrid nature of 
financial markets altogether. 
34 The rough idea here would be to ring fence public debt issues as far as 
possible within domestic law, and to specify very demanding 
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of public debt would have considerable wherewithal over 
private creditors.  
 
A methodological conclusion 
We have argued that the prevailing discourses on public 
debt are ideological: moralism and technocracy mask a politics 
of public debt that is little more than a power game between 
elites, and as such is insensitive to the concerns of the vast 
majority of those affected by it. We have also seen that this is 
not a form of legitimate democratic politics, and so we put 
forward two ideas for how to ameliorate the situation. 
In conclusion, it may be worth saying a little more about 
why our recommendations are so tentative—a limitation that, 
we maintain, is at least in part due to our methodological 
stance. An obvious methodological lesson from the preceding 
discussion concerns the perils of ideology  in political argument, 
both public and academic. We trust those have been 
expounded sufficiently in the body of the paper. However, an 
extension of that lesson may be worth highlighting here, 
namely a general caution about the limits of theory, and its 
inability to float above the fray of politics—much like the 
common sense and scientistic overreach we have diagnosed in 
the moralistic and technocratic frames, respectively. So the 
realist moral of the story here is that when theory or common 
sense try to invade the domain of politics and float above it they 
are at high risk of ideological distortion. On issues such as public 
debt our philosophical arguments can join the political fray but 
cannot claim to transcend it. Besides, the very context-
sensitivity that drives our argument for politicising public debt 
all the way down cautions against theorising policy blueprints 
in quasi-algorithmic abstraction from local realities. In other 
words, if we are serious about politicising financial power in a 
democratic way, we should heed the realist call for 
philosophical modesty: in addition to reminding ourselves that 
the political philosopher is always socially situated, the lesson 
here is that a lot of the terrain often claimed by political 
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